Report Warns on Serious Mental Problems in Teens Using Pot
- Thread starter Relic
- Start date
-
Beat This!The next Beat This! Competition is from November 27-28th!
Chrono
polyphonically beyond me
ill o.g.
Battle Points: 5
it's not addicting as in i need it... it's pleasurable as in i want it!! it sucks that I lost all my connections and have no way of finding any.. i am too busy to smoke on the daily but it would be nice to have some for the weekends. I really enjoy a high, much more than alcohol.. it is an injustice that as an adult my only choice is alcohol!! forcing me to be a criminal to enjoy something more realistic as an intoxicant than alcohol. it's an injustice to offer me the only legal intoxication as alcohol... a drug so dangerous it has it's own disease that stretches through generations genetically. i just hope the laws are rightous before my time on earth is up
Benny BuKu
BAD NEWS
ill o.g.
"Weed makes you happy, hungry and sleepy. That's it. You aint never seen a nigga overdose on weed. You might've thought he was dead, he aint dead. He gon wake up in an hour hungry enough to eat everything in this house. Weed won't kill you but take 13 of them aspirins and that will be the last headache you ever have."- Kat Williams
Word!!!
RigorMortis
Army Of Darkness
ill o.g.
i've never seen a pothead do a schoolshooting, so i think it is a good investment instead of the shooting range with their uncle jedediah!
Formant024
Digital Smokerings
ill o.g.
rolls....
Sanova
Guess Who's Back
ill o.g.
Battle Points: 9
Didn't read the entire thing because of the shear presence of words such as: could, may, etc.
Why publish a report based on speculation, it actually contradicts the entire purpose of a report in the first place... but none the less......
smoke weed, or don't. If you fuck your body up, you were probably already fucked up, you just needed weed to realize it. Now you know why no one sat with you at lunch in high school. not directed at anyone just typing for no reason
Why publish a report based on speculation, it actually contradicts the entire purpose of a report in the first place... but none the less......
smoke weed, or don't. If you fuck your body up, you were probably already fucked up, you just needed weed to realize it. Now you know why no one sat with you at lunch in high school. not directed at anyone just typing for no reason
S
Svenghali
Guest
Know Your History!!!
This is propaganda bullshit! I've been smokin' now 16 years. And plenty of my folks been blazin' as long as me (if not longer) and they all remain in full control of their faculties. If you have tendencies such as suicide or a history of mental health issues, a simple argument with ya girlfriend can set you off.
Since Relic was so kind to post that U.S. government propaganda (r u an agent?), I'd like to counter with some, let's just call 'em "actualities". I stress to all you younger cats never take information at face value. RESEARCH. No matter the subject. You can find tons of information on misinformation or you can be spoon fed whatever those in power want you to believe. We're all unwilling pawns in this game. Those with money and power against those who have neither. There was talk regarding alcohol. Research. http://www.saferchoice.org/content/view/24/53/
Check this thesis out!
Abstract of Masters Thesis Presented to the Faculty
of the Division of Humanities of Pepperdine University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
By
John Craig Lupien
April, 1995
Chair: John McClung, Ph. D.
The primary goal of this thesis is to reveal a new perspective with regard to the dilemma of the prohibition of marihuana. In particular, the subject matter delves into the specific history of the hemp industry of the 1930s. According to this author's research, the circumstances surrounding the evolution of the marihuana issue in the United States were directly effected by certain developments in the hemp and wood pulp industries of the 1930s. Aspects of this thesis are not entirely original and the author is indebted to the efforts of previous researchers. However, the main arguments of this thesis have been based upon original material.
Introduction
Hidden Motives
Since the dawn of civilization, people have cultivated the plant known scientifically as cannabis and agriculturally as hemp for its fiber, seed, and pharmaceutical properties. Throughout the world, the records of archaeology and history reveal that humanity universally recognized the benefits of this unique plant. Such recognition ended abruptly in 1930, when the newly created Federal Bureau of Narcotics began to educate the American public about marihuana, as hemp had been known colloquially in the Sonoran region of Mexico. Between 1930 and 1934, the Bureau compiled a body of misinformation which suggested that the use of marihuana was directly linked to crime, induced violent behavior, and caused insanity. Then, suddenly, in 1935, the Bureau flooded the nation with educational propaganda against marihuana use. During this act of demonization, the Bureau continuously cited its own accumulated body of misinformation as a precedent for legislation on the federal level. Through this studied deception, the Bureau effectively lobbied for the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, which considerably restricted the usage, distribution, and production of marihuana. Significantly, restrictions on marihuana automatically implied restrictions on the cultivation of hemp.
Several highly suspicious circumstances surround the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' demonization of marihuana in the 1930s. First, there never was a marihuana problem; this manufactured malady was a great media spoof. Secondly, the misinformation, which was disseminated to the public by the Bureau, was based on conjecture and hearsay; the objective truth and the scientific method were summarily discarded. Furthermore, the Bureau even suppressed and ignored information which was unbiased, objective, and contradicted its own special brand of demonization. The whole scenario of the Bureau's "marihuana education" program is an amazing example of how easily the American public could be deceived by a slick propaganda campaign. In retrospect, this trail of deceitful acts raises the possibility that the Bureau's decision to demonize marihuana may have been prompted by hidden motives.
By strange coincidence the final assault of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics on marihuana occurred simultaneously with its own awareness of the emergence of a new hemp industry in America in 1935. This new hemp industry was based on the commercial practicability of producing raw cellulose pulp from hemp for the manufacture of paper. The Bureau seems to have demonized marihuana for motives that went far beyond its mandate to legally regulate the production and distribution of the drug. Specifically, the Bureau provided the perfect vehicle for vested interests who wanted to terminate the movement to develop a hemp-based paper industry. Marihuana was demonized by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in the 1930s because of the hemp plant's promising economic future.
This hypothesis, that the demonization of marihuana was a result of the hemp plant's economic potential, is not entirely original. In large part it is based on the observations of previous researchers. Their insights into why the Federal Bureau of Narcotics demonized marihuana in the 1930s are particularly relevant to this hypothesis. Because of this relevancy, it is necessary to briefly introduce the basic arguments of these previous researchers. The arguments may be easily separated into two sets of explanations.
The first explanation was provided by the decriminalization movement, which started in the late 1960s. According to decriminalization scholars, the prohibition of marihuana should be understood as an unfortunate result of the ideological climate of the day. Typically, modern historians use the term Progressive to describe the ideological climate of the early twentieth century. This period of time was characterized by strong convictions favoring the ideals of Calvinistic Protestantism, Scientific Materialism, and Uninhibited Capitalism. Aspects of these three philosophies were blended in America and became manifest in Progressivism, the ideology of the predominantly WASP upper- and middle-classes.
For the everyday person caught in the grind of everyday life Progressivism translated into an endless quantification of one's value toward society. Value was measured by the job or work being performed by the person. Jobs or work were graded on the basis of the wealth they generated. This situation created a hierarchy in which the wealthy elite formed an plutocracy. In order to justify its existence this plutocracy actively promoted Progressivism. The essential tenet of this philosophy was based on the strategy of promoting the virtues of work and chastising the vices of idleness. To entice the masses to follow this ethic, the ideology was imbued with the assumption that hard work was the secret to material wealth and earthly paradise. From this syllogism, it was only natural that the acquisition of material wealth was portrayed as the ideal pursuit for people. This formula for success was the source of the modern American work ethic.
The Progressive mentality infected the predominantly WASP upper- and middle-classes of America. This socio-economic and cultural cross-section of American society was deeply affected by a latent xenophobia. This innate nativism definitely prejudiced the Progressive policy toward drugs during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Ideologically, the Progressives followed the notion that certain social customs were vices which impeded people from focusing on their work and generating more wealth. On the basis of this reasoning, the federal government was pressured to impose moral imperatives on the American populace by removing perceived vices through prohibitive legislation. The most well-known historical example of this type of Progressive social experimentation was the Eighteenth Amendment, the prohibition of alcohol. Ironically, Western cultures had always considered alcohol to be an acceptable vice. The failure of prohibition during the 1920s is attributed to the previous consideration, since drinking was the customary accompaniment for most leisure activities in America.
Marihuana, unlike alcohol, was generally unknown to the American people until the 1960s. The drug was first discovered during the first decade of the twentieth century among Mexican immigrant communities in the Southwest, where marihuana was used both recreationally and medicinally. Shortly after the initial discovery of this customary practice, local officials succumbed to the influence of xenophobic prejudices and seized on marihuana use as a medium to suppress unwanted Mexican immigrants. To gain support for legislation suppressing marihuana, these local officials verified and spread rumors that the use of marihuana caused crime and violence. In time, marihuana began to appear in the cities. The same biased rumors inspired authorities in the cities to meld marihuana into the evolving Progressive policy toward narcotic drugs. Prohibition was the cornerstone of this policy. Thus, during the first quarter of the twentieth century, state and local laws were easily passed against the non-medicinal use of marihuana. However, after examining these early efforts to prohibit the drug, decriminalization scholars were quick to note the troubling absence of any scientific or historical evidence to suggest the existence of a true problem with marihuana. Instead, they traced the rationale for the isolated incidences of legislation on the state and local levels to xenophobia and the emerging Progressive policy with regard to narcotic drugs.
In 1930, the newly created Federal Bureau of Narcotics adopted marihuana as a federal issue. According to decriminalization scholars, the Bureau proceeded on the basis of the previously given rationale for state and local legislation, freely citing the unfounded rumors of xenophobic officials and the prevaricated data of overzealous Progressives as a precedent for its action. The Bureau believed that this body of information was credible. Of course, this explanation implies that the people in the Bureau were totally ignorant of unbiased and objective data gathering techniques, otherwise known as the scientific method. By the 1930s, the scientific method was the standard applied to all questions needing objective answers, but for some reason this practice was ignored within the Bureau.
Despite the Bureau's puzzling disregard for objectivity, decriminalization scholars maintained that the Bureau's decision to demonize marihuana in the 1930s, and especially from 1935 on, was an unfortunate result of the ideological climate of the day, Progressivism tempered by the latent xenophobia of the middle- and upper-class WASP majority. The previous explanation tends to lose the historical truth by feeding the interpreter into the convenience of its logic, since it leads one to believe that the Bureau was merely acting as an extension of the general will of the people. To the contrary, the simplicity of such an explanation fails to take into account the fact that the Bureau created the prevalent public opinion through the final act of demonization. This act was definitely premeditated and the Bureau was primarily responsible.
Until recently, the decriminalization thesis was the only academic explanation for the prohibition of marihuana. However, during the past decade a second generation of legalization literature has surfaced. This new movement presented a conspiracy thesis to explain why the Federal Bureau of Narcotics demonized marihuana in the 1930s. At first glance the conspiracy thesis seems like quite a stretch of the imagination from the decriminalization movement's attempt to describe a docile Bureau, which acted on the public's outcry against the evils of marihuana. Instead, the conspiracy thesis suggested that hemp was destined to become one of the largest cash crop ever grown because of its industrial value as a source of raw cellulose. According to Jack Herer, the leading proponent of this second generation of legalization literature, the Bureau was a tool of vested interests who sought to protect their business investments because they feared the loss of profits if hemp made a comeback as an industrial commodity.
The company which was cited as having the most to lose was E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Company, hereafter referred to as Du Pont. During the company's one hundred year plus history it had transacted business with only two banks. One of these banks was the Mellon Bank of Pittsburgh. This bank was owned by the Secretary of Treasury, Andrew Mellon. On the basis of this banking connection, Herer assumed that Mellon's interests were in tune with Du Pont's interests in the most intimate manner financially. As the Secretary of Treasury, Mellon appointed his future nephew-in-law, Harry J. Anslinger, to head the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The new Commissioner and his Bureau successfully lobbied for the prohibition of marihuana just as the new hemp industry began to emerge as a potential threat to Du Pont's business.
As further confirmation of Du Pont's intentions, Herer cited a Du Pont Annual Report from 1937. On the pages of this report, investment in the company was recommended by Du Pont's chairman, who somehow foresaw that "radical changes from the revenue raising power of government would be converted into instruments for forcing acceptance of sudden new ideas of industrial and social reorganization." Herer acknowledged the previous statement as a signal from Du Pont's chairman that the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was created to protect company interests. Apparently, Du Pont had patented processes and was developing others to make plastics from oil and coal, as well as paper pulp from wood. In all, these lucrative chemical patents accounted for eighty percent of Du Pont's business during the following fifty-year period. This meant that Du Pont had billions at stake, which were invested in processes to derive cellulose from raw materials other than hemp. If hemp had remained legal, Du Pont would not have had the market cornered on cellulose-based industries. With these thoughts in mind, Herer suggested that Du Pont conspired with Mellon to eliminate the competition.
In addition to Du Pont and Mellon, Herer also noted the significant role played by the nation's largest publisher, the Hearst syndicate, in helping to create the fundamental story line about the new narcotic menace, marihuana. When the Bureau was created in 1930, it adopted views similar to those of Hearst, gave them the authority of the federal government, and paraded them before the public as the truth. According to Herer, Hearst's brand of anti-marihuana journalism was initially influenced by his extreme prejudice toward Mexicans, African-Americans, and the jazz movement. However, later during the 1930s, Hearst recycled his old stories and used them as cover to protect his substantial financial interest in the paper industry.
The second generation conspiracy thesis sheds new insight on the central question of this thesis: Why was marihuana demonized during the 1930s? Specifically, the idea of a conspiracy is intriguing. And new original research reveals virgin information which supports the conclusions of the second generation conspiracy thesis. Evidently, during the 1930s, the idea that vested interests were exerting a controlling influence on the course of public policy was a serious topic both in the media and in the federal government. By the late 1920s, after a decade of Federal Trade Commission investigations into the lobbying activities of gigantic public utility holding companies, the truth about the corrupting influence of these vested interests was finally beginning to reach the public. The methods of persuasions employed by the private concerns were as blatant as courting government officials to as subtle as distributing propaganda to school children and placing editorials in newspapers. Building on such revelations, an enormous money trust was uncovered in 1933. Du Pont and the Mellon Bank were both participants in this money trust, which was ultimately presided over by the nation's most powerful banking house, J. P. Morgan & Company.
At the height of these proceedings J. P. Morgan, Jr. appeared before the Senate Banking and Finance Committee Hearings and rendered the following opinion about the business of high finance.
"I state without hesitation that I consider the private banker a national asset and not a national danger. As to the theory that he may become too powerful, it must be remembered that any power which he has comes, not from the possession of large means, but from the confidence of the people in his character and credit, and that that power, having no force to back it, would disappear at once if people thought that the character had changed or the credit had diminished - not financial credit, but that which comes from the respect and esteem of the community."
Throughout the investigations, special prosecutor Ferdinand Pecora made a mockery of Morgan's previous statement. From the testimony of the nation's leading bankers and the analysis of their company's records, Pecora revealed an intricate web of interlocking directorates among the nation's leading banks and corporations. Based on his observations, Pecora suggested the existence of an economic monopoly of national proportions.
Such an accusation was a common theme among the reactionary elements of the day, who frequently alleged that the American economy was controlled by a "money trust." What these reactionaries observed during the early 1930s was the grand culmination of the Morgan inspired movement to consolidate business interests. Theoretically, the resultant monopolies would create financial stability amidst the chaos of competition. However, in reality, the situation pandered to self-interest. By controlling the boards of the nation's leading corporations and industry committees, certain banks, particularly J. P. Morgan & Company, were able to exert an invisible influence over the course of economic development in America. Monetary gain always preceded all other matters.22
The implicit irony between Morgan's lofty statement and the actual truth about the American business environment has a very profound relevance to this particular inquiry; specifically, the idea that the power to influence events does not lie in financial means, but rather in the trust of the public. Irony pervades this naïve belief. In economics money directs the final outcome of events. Time and time again, the historical record clearly demonstrates that business interests have taken precedence over the mandates of moral majorities and the consideration of the public's welfare. The case is no different when applied to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' campaign against marihuana. Certain industries controlled by the money trust stood to lose billions of dollars in revenue if the new hemp industry was successful. The innate desire to protect their business investments motivated the leaders of the threatened industries to seek the aid of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to ensure the failure of the new hemp industry. Acting on these hidden motives, the Bureau implemented an educational propaganda campaign about the evils of marihuana. On the basis of the evidence presented by the Bureau, marihuana was effectively demonized in the minds of the American public and the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was passed by Congress. Together, the act of demonization and regulatory legislation destroyed the chances of the new hemp industry becoming established as a viable economy in America.
On the ensuing pages, an elaborate argument to support the main contention of this thesis, that the new hemp industry was politically assassinated by the money trust, will be presented. First, in order to justify the concept of demonization, which is central to this thesis, the history of the role of marihuana throughout the centuries in the world at large and in America, in particular, will be briefly provided. A thorough explanation of the origins of the new hemp industry will be included with this history. In the next section the material will trace the evolution of the marihuana issue in America. Continuing, the two previous sections will then be tied together and the focus will shift onto the final act of demonization, which resulted in the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. For the final two sections of this thesis, additional evidence in support of the main contention will be presented by analyzing the immediate repercussions of the Tax Act and the aftermath of prohibition. When finished, this thesis should have created a foundation for further detailed investigations of what is a uniquely American dilemma, the prohibition of marihuana because of the hemp plant's economic promise.
Nuff said???
This is propaganda bullshit! I've been smokin' now 16 years. And plenty of my folks been blazin' as long as me (if not longer) and they all remain in full control of their faculties. If you have tendencies such as suicide or a history of mental health issues, a simple argument with ya girlfriend can set you off.
Since Relic was so kind to post that U.S. government propaganda (r u an agent?), I'd like to counter with some, let's just call 'em "actualities". I stress to all you younger cats never take information at face value. RESEARCH. No matter the subject. You can find tons of information on misinformation or you can be spoon fed whatever those in power want you to believe. We're all unwilling pawns in this game. Those with money and power against those who have neither. There was talk regarding alcohol. Research. http://www.saferchoice.org/content/view/24/53/
Check this thesis out!
Abstract of Masters Thesis Presented to the Faculty
of the Division of Humanities of Pepperdine University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
By
John Craig Lupien
April, 1995
Chair: John McClung, Ph. D.
The primary goal of this thesis is to reveal a new perspective with regard to the dilemma of the prohibition of marihuana. In particular, the subject matter delves into the specific history of the hemp industry of the 1930s. According to this author's research, the circumstances surrounding the evolution of the marihuana issue in the United States were directly effected by certain developments in the hemp and wood pulp industries of the 1930s. Aspects of this thesis are not entirely original and the author is indebted to the efforts of previous researchers. However, the main arguments of this thesis have been based upon original material.
Introduction
Hidden Motives
Since the dawn of civilization, people have cultivated the plant known scientifically as cannabis and agriculturally as hemp for its fiber, seed, and pharmaceutical properties. Throughout the world, the records of archaeology and history reveal that humanity universally recognized the benefits of this unique plant. Such recognition ended abruptly in 1930, when the newly created Federal Bureau of Narcotics began to educate the American public about marihuana, as hemp had been known colloquially in the Sonoran region of Mexico. Between 1930 and 1934, the Bureau compiled a body of misinformation which suggested that the use of marihuana was directly linked to crime, induced violent behavior, and caused insanity. Then, suddenly, in 1935, the Bureau flooded the nation with educational propaganda against marihuana use. During this act of demonization, the Bureau continuously cited its own accumulated body of misinformation as a precedent for legislation on the federal level. Through this studied deception, the Bureau effectively lobbied for the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, which considerably restricted the usage, distribution, and production of marihuana. Significantly, restrictions on marihuana automatically implied restrictions on the cultivation of hemp.
Several highly suspicious circumstances surround the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' demonization of marihuana in the 1930s. First, there never was a marihuana problem; this manufactured malady was a great media spoof. Secondly, the misinformation, which was disseminated to the public by the Bureau, was based on conjecture and hearsay; the objective truth and the scientific method were summarily discarded. Furthermore, the Bureau even suppressed and ignored information which was unbiased, objective, and contradicted its own special brand of demonization. The whole scenario of the Bureau's "marihuana education" program is an amazing example of how easily the American public could be deceived by a slick propaganda campaign. In retrospect, this trail of deceitful acts raises the possibility that the Bureau's decision to demonize marihuana may have been prompted by hidden motives.
By strange coincidence the final assault of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics on marihuana occurred simultaneously with its own awareness of the emergence of a new hemp industry in America in 1935. This new hemp industry was based on the commercial practicability of producing raw cellulose pulp from hemp for the manufacture of paper. The Bureau seems to have demonized marihuana for motives that went far beyond its mandate to legally regulate the production and distribution of the drug. Specifically, the Bureau provided the perfect vehicle for vested interests who wanted to terminate the movement to develop a hemp-based paper industry. Marihuana was demonized by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in the 1930s because of the hemp plant's promising economic future.
This hypothesis, that the demonization of marihuana was a result of the hemp plant's economic potential, is not entirely original. In large part it is based on the observations of previous researchers. Their insights into why the Federal Bureau of Narcotics demonized marihuana in the 1930s are particularly relevant to this hypothesis. Because of this relevancy, it is necessary to briefly introduce the basic arguments of these previous researchers. The arguments may be easily separated into two sets of explanations.
The first explanation was provided by the decriminalization movement, which started in the late 1960s. According to decriminalization scholars, the prohibition of marihuana should be understood as an unfortunate result of the ideological climate of the day. Typically, modern historians use the term Progressive to describe the ideological climate of the early twentieth century. This period of time was characterized by strong convictions favoring the ideals of Calvinistic Protestantism, Scientific Materialism, and Uninhibited Capitalism. Aspects of these three philosophies were blended in America and became manifest in Progressivism, the ideology of the predominantly WASP upper- and middle-classes.
For the everyday person caught in the grind of everyday life Progressivism translated into an endless quantification of one's value toward society. Value was measured by the job or work being performed by the person. Jobs or work were graded on the basis of the wealth they generated. This situation created a hierarchy in which the wealthy elite formed an plutocracy. In order to justify its existence this plutocracy actively promoted Progressivism. The essential tenet of this philosophy was based on the strategy of promoting the virtues of work and chastising the vices of idleness. To entice the masses to follow this ethic, the ideology was imbued with the assumption that hard work was the secret to material wealth and earthly paradise. From this syllogism, it was only natural that the acquisition of material wealth was portrayed as the ideal pursuit for people. This formula for success was the source of the modern American work ethic.
The Progressive mentality infected the predominantly WASP upper- and middle-classes of America. This socio-economic and cultural cross-section of American society was deeply affected by a latent xenophobia. This innate nativism definitely prejudiced the Progressive policy toward drugs during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Ideologically, the Progressives followed the notion that certain social customs were vices which impeded people from focusing on their work and generating more wealth. On the basis of this reasoning, the federal government was pressured to impose moral imperatives on the American populace by removing perceived vices through prohibitive legislation. The most well-known historical example of this type of Progressive social experimentation was the Eighteenth Amendment, the prohibition of alcohol. Ironically, Western cultures had always considered alcohol to be an acceptable vice. The failure of prohibition during the 1920s is attributed to the previous consideration, since drinking was the customary accompaniment for most leisure activities in America.
Marihuana, unlike alcohol, was generally unknown to the American people until the 1960s. The drug was first discovered during the first decade of the twentieth century among Mexican immigrant communities in the Southwest, where marihuana was used both recreationally and medicinally. Shortly after the initial discovery of this customary practice, local officials succumbed to the influence of xenophobic prejudices and seized on marihuana use as a medium to suppress unwanted Mexican immigrants. To gain support for legislation suppressing marihuana, these local officials verified and spread rumors that the use of marihuana caused crime and violence. In time, marihuana began to appear in the cities. The same biased rumors inspired authorities in the cities to meld marihuana into the evolving Progressive policy toward narcotic drugs. Prohibition was the cornerstone of this policy. Thus, during the first quarter of the twentieth century, state and local laws were easily passed against the non-medicinal use of marihuana. However, after examining these early efforts to prohibit the drug, decriminalization scholars were quick to note the troubling absence of any scientific or historical evidence to suggest the existence of a true problem with marihuana. Instead, they traced the rationale for the isolated incidences of legislation on the state and local levels to xenophobia and the emerging Progressive policy with regard to narcotic drugs.
In 1930, the newly created Federal Bureau of Narcotics adopted marihuana as a federal issue. According to decriminalization scholars, the Bureau proceeded on the basis of the previously given rationale for state and local legislation, freely citing the unfounded rumors of xenophobic officials and the prevaricated data of overzealous Progressives as a precedent for its action. The Bureau believed that this body of information was credible. Of course, this explanation implies that the people in the Bureau were totally ignorant of unbiased and objective data gathering techniques, otherwise known as the scientific method. By the 1930s, the scientific method was the standard applied to all questions needing objective answers, but for some reason this practice was ignored within the Bureau.
Despite the Bureau's puzzling disregard for objectivity, decriminalization scholars maintained that the Bureau's decision to demonize marihuana in the 1930s, and especially from 1935 on, was an unfortunate result of the ideological climate of the day, Progressivism tempered by the latent xenophobia of the middle- and upper-class WASP majority. The previous explanation tends to lose the historical truth by feeding the interpreter into the convenience of its logic, since it leads one to believe that the Bureau was merely acting as an extension of the general will of the people. To the contrary, the simplicity of such an explanation fails to take into account the fact that the Bureau created the prevalent public opinion through the final act of demonization. This act was definitely premeditated and the Bureau was primarily responsible.
Until recently, the decriminalization thesis was the only academic explanation for the prohibition of marihuana. However, during the past decade a second generation of legalization literature has surfaced. This new movement presented a conspiracy thesis to explain why the Federal Bureau of Narcotics demonized marihuana in the 1930s. At first glance the conspiracy thesis seems like quite a stretch of the imagination from the decriminalization movement's attempt to describe a docile Bureau, which acted on the public's outcry against the evils of marihuana. Instead, the conspiracy thesis suggested that hemp was destined to become one of the largest cash crop ever grown because of its industrial value as a source of raw cellulose. According to Jack Herer, the leading proponent of this second generation of legalization literature, the Bureau was a tool of vested interests who sought to protect their business investments because they feared the loss of profits if hemp made a comeback as an industrial commodity.
The company which was cited as having the most to lose was E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Company, hereafter referred to as Du Pont. During the company's one hundred year plus history it had transacted business with only two banks. One of these banks was the Mellon Bank of Pittsburgh. This bank was owned by the Secretary of Treasury, Andrew Mellon. On the basis of this banking connection, Herer assumed that Mellon's interests were in tune with Du Pont's interests in the most intimate manner financially. As the Secretary of Treasury, Mellon appointed his future nephew-in-law, Harry J. Anslinger, to head the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The new Commissioner and his Bureau successfully lobbied for the prohibition of marihuana just as the new hemp industry began to emerge as a potential threat to Du Pont's business.
As further confirmation of Du Pont's intentions, Herer cited a Du Pont Annual Report from 1937. On the pages of this report, investment in the company was recommended by Du Pont's chairman, who somehow foresaw that "radical changes from the revenue raising power of government would be converted into instruments for forcing acceptance of sudden new ideas of industrial and social reorganization." Herer acknowledged the previous statement as a signal from Du Pont's chairman that the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was created to protect company interests. Apparently, Du Pont had patented processes and was developing others to make plastics from oil and coal, as well as paper pulp from wood. In all, these lucrative chemical patents accounted for eighty percent of Du Pont's business during the following fifty-year period. This meant that Du Pont had billions at stake, which were invested in processes to derive cellulose from raw materials other than hemp. If hemp had remained legal, Du Pont would not have had the market cornered on cellulose-based industries. With these thoughts in mind, Herer suggested that Du Pont conspired with Mellon to eliminate the competition.
In addition to Du Pont and Mellon, Herer also noted the significant role played by the nation's largest publisher, the Hearst syndicate, in helping to create the fundamental story line about the new narcotic menace, marihuana. When the Bureau was created in 1930, it adopted views similar to those of Hearst, gave them the authority of the federal government, and paraded them before the public as the truth. According to Herer, Hearst's brand of anti-marihuana journalism was initially influenced by his extreme prejudice toward Mexicans, African-Americans, and the jazz movement. However, later during the 1930s, Hearst recycled his old stories and used them as cover to protect his substantial financial interest in the paper industry.
The second generation conspiracy thesis sheds new insight on the central question of this thesis: Why was marihuana demonized during the 1930s? Specifically, the idea of a conspiracy is intriguing. And new original research reveals virgin information which supports the conclusions of the second generation conspiracy thesis. Evidently, during the 1930s, the idea that vested interests were exerting a controlling influence on the course of public policy was a serious topic both in the media and in the federal government. By the late 1920s, after a decade of Federal Trade Commission investigations into the lobbying activities of gigantic public utility holding companies, the truth about the corrupting influence of these vested interests was finally beginning to reach the public. The methods of persuasions employed by the private concerns were as blatant as courting government officials to as subtle as distributing propaganda to school children and placing editorials in newspapers. Building on such revelations, an enormous money trust was uncovered in 1933. Du Pont and the Mellon Bank were both participants in this money trust, which was ultimately presided over by the nation's most powerful banking house, J. P. Morgan & Company.
At the height of these proceedings J. P. Morgan, Jr. appeared before the Senate Banking and Finance Committee Hearings and rendered the following opinion about the business of high finance.
"I state without hesitation that I consider the private banker a national asset and not a national danger. As to the theory that he may become too powerful, it must be remembered that any power which he has comes, not from the possession of large means, but from the confidence of the people in his character and credit, and that that power, having no force to back it, would disappear at once if people thought that the character had changed or the credit had diminished - not financial credit, but that which comes from the respect and esteem of the community."
Throughout the investigations, special prosecutor Ferdinand Pecora made a mockery of Morgan's previous statement. From the testimony of the nation's leading bankers and the analysis of their company's records, Pecora revealed an intricate web of interlocking directorates among the nation's leading banks and corporations. Based on his observations, Pecora suggested the existence of an economic monopoly of national proportions.
Such an accusation was a common theme among the reactionary elements of the day, who frequently alleged that the American economy was controlled by a "money trust." What these reactionaries observed during the early 1930s was the grand culmination of the Morgan inspired movement to consolidate business interests. Theoretically, the resultant monopolies would create financial stability amidst the chaos of competition. However, in reality, the situation pandered to self-interest. By controlling the boards of the nation's leading corporations and industry committees, certain banks, particularly J. P. Morgan & Company, were able to exert an invisible influence over the course of economic development in America. Monetary gain always preceded all other matters.22
The implicit irony between Morgan's lofty statement and the actual truth about the American business environment has a very profound relevance to this particular inquiry; specifically, the idea that the power to influence events does not lie in financial means, but rather in the trust of the public. Irony pervades this naïve belief. In economics money directs the final outcome of events. Time and time again, the historical record clearly demonstrates that business interests have taken precedence over the mandates of moral majorities and the consideration of the public's welfare. The case is no different when applied to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' campaign against marihuana. Certain industries controlled by the money trust stood to lose billions of dollars in revenue if the new hemp industry was successful. The innate desire to protect their business investments motivated the leaders of the threatened industries to seek the aid of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to ensure the failure of the new hemp industry. Acting on these hidden motives, the Bureau implemented an educational propaganda campaign about the evils of marihuana. On the basis of the evidence presented by the Bureau, marihuana was effectively demonized in the minds of the American public and the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was passed by Congress. Together, the act of demonization and regulatory legislation destroyed the chances of the new hemp industry becoming established as a viable economy in America.
On the ensuing pages, an elaborate argument to support the main contention of this thesis, that the new hemp industry was politically assassinated by the money trust, will be presented. First, in order to justify the concept of demonization, which is central to this thesis, the history of the role of marihuana throughout the centuries in the world at large and in America, in particular, will be briefly provided. A thorough explanation of the origins of the new hemp industry will be included with this history. In the next section the material will trace the evolution of the marihuana issue in America. Continuing, the two previous sections will then be tied together and the focus will shift onto the final act of demonization, which resulted in the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. For the final two sections of this thesis, additional evidence in support of the main contention will be presented by analyzing the immediate repercussions of the Tax Act and the aftermath of prohibition. When finished, this thesis should have created a foundation for further detailed investigations of what is a uniquely American dilemma, the prohibition of marihuana because of the hemp plant's economic promise.
Nuff said???
S
Svenghali
Guest
Know Your History!!!
This is propaganda bullshit! I've been smokin' now 16 years. And plenty of my folks been blazin' as long as me (if not longer) and they all remain in full control of their faculties. If you have tendencies such as suicide or a history of mental health issues, a simple argument with ya girlfriend can set you off.
Since Relic was so kind to post that U.S. government propaganda (r u an agent?), I'd like to counter with some, let's just call 'em "actualities". I stress to all you younger cats never take information at face value. RESEARCH. No matter the subject. You can find tons of information on misinformation or you can be spoon fed whatever those in power want you to believe. We're all unwilling pawns in this game. Those with money and power against those who have neither. There was talk regarding alcohol. Research. http://www.saferchoice.org/content/view/24/53/
Check this thesis out!
Abstract of Masters Thesis Presented to the Faculty
of the Division of Humanities of Pepperdine University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
By
John Craig Lupien
April, 1995
Chair: John McClung, Ph. D.
The primary goal of this thesis is to reveal a new perspective with regard to the dilemma of the prohibition of marihuana. In particular, the subject matter delves into the specific history of the hemp industry of the 1930s. According to this author's research, the circumstances surrounding the evolution of the marihuana issue in the United States were directly effected by certain developments in the hemp and wood pulp industries of the 1930s. Aspects of this thesis are not entirely original and the author is indebted to the efforts of previous researchers. However, the main arguments of this thesis have been based upon original material.
Introduction
Hidden Motives
Since the dawn of civilization, people have cultivated the plant known scientifically as cannabis and agriculturally as hemp for its fiber, seed, and pharmaceutical properties. Throughout the world, the records of archaeology and history reveal that humanity universally recognized the benefits of this unique plant. Such recognition ended abruptly in 1930, when the newly created Federal Bureau of Narcotics began to educate the American public about marihuana, as hemp had been known colloquially in the Sonoran region of Mexico. Between 1930 and 1934, the Bureau compiled a body of misinformation which suggested that the use of marihuana was directly linked to crime, induced violent behavior, and caused insanity. Then, suddenly, in 1935, the Bureau flooded the nation with educational propaganda against marihuana use. During this act of demonization, the Bureau continuously cited its own accumulated body of misinformation as a precedent for legislation on the federal level. Through this studied deception, the Bureau effectively lobbied for the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, which considerably restricted the usage, distribution, and production of marihuana. Significantly, restrictions on marihuana automatically implied restrictions on the cultivation of hemp.
Several highly suspicious circumstances surround the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' demonization of marihuana in the 1930s. First, there never was a marihuana problem; this manufactured malady was a great media spoof. Secondly, the misinformation, which was disseminated to the public by the Bureau, was based on conjecture and hearsay; the objective truth and the scientific method were summarily discarded. Furthermore, the Bureau even suppressed and ignored information which was unbiased, objective, and contradicted its own special brand of demonization. The whole scenario of the Bureau's "marihuana education" program is an amazing example of how easily the American public could be deceived by a slick propaganda campaign. In retrospect, this trail of deceitful acts raises the possibility that the Bureau's decision to demonize marihuana may have been prompted by hidden motives.
By strange coincidence the final assault of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics on marihuana occurred simultaneously with its own awareness of the emergence of a new hemp industry in America in 1935. This new hemp industry was based on the commercial practicability of producing raw cellulose pulp from hemp for the manufacture of paper. The Bureau seems to have demonized marihuana for motives that went far beyond its mandate to legally regulate the production and distribution of the drug. Specifically, the Bureau provided the perfect vehicle for vested interests who wanted to terminate the movement to develop a hemp-based paper industry. Marihuana was demonized by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in the 1930s because of the hemp plant's promising economic future.
This hypothesis, that the demonization of marihuana was a result of the hemp plant's economic potential, is not entirely original. In large part it is based on the observations of previous researchers. Their insights into why the Federal Bureau of Narcotics demonized marihuana in the 1930s are particularly relevant to this hypothesis. Because of this relevancy, it is necessary to briefly introduce the basic arguments of these previous researchers. The arguments may be easily separated into two sets of explanations.
The first explanation was provided by the decriminalization movement, which started in the late 1960s. According to decriminalization scholars, the prohibition of marihuana should be understood as an unfortunate result of the ideological climate of the day. Typically, modern historians use the term Progressive to describe the ideological climate of the early twentieth century. This period of time was characterized by strong convictions favoring the ideals of Calvinistic Protestantism, Scientific Materialism, and Uninhibited Capitalism. Aspects of these three philosophies were blended in America and became manifest in Progressivism, the ideology of the predominantly WASP upper- and middle-classes.
For the everyday person caught in the grind of everyday life Progressivism translated into an endless quantification of one's value toward society. Value was measured by the job or work being performed by the person. Jobs or work were graded on the basis of the wealth they generated. This situation created a hierarchy in which the wealthy elite formed an plutocracy. In order to justify its existence this plutocracy actively promoted Progressivism. The essential tenet of this philosophy was based on the strategy of promoting the virtues of work and chastising the vices of idleness. To entice the masses to follow this ethic, the ideology was imbued with the assumption that hard work was the secret to material wealth and earthly paradise. From this syllogism, it was only natural that the acquisition of material wealth was portrayed as the ideal pursuit for people. This formula for success was the source of the modern American work ethic.
The Progressive mentality infected the predominantly WASP upper- and middle-classes of America. This socio-economic and cultural cross-section of American society was deeply affected by a latent xenophobia. This innate nativism definitely prejudiced the Progressive policy toward drugs during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Ideologically, the Progressives followed the notion that certain social customs were vices which impeded people from focusing on their work and generating more wealth. On the basis of this reasoning, the federal government was pressured to impose moral imperatives on the American populace by removing perceived vices through prohibitive legislation. The most well-known historical example of this type of Progressive social experimentation was the Eighteenth Amendment, the prohibition of alcohol. Ironically, Western cultures had always considered alcohol to be an acceptable vice. The failure of prohibition during the 1920s is attributed to the previous consideration, since drinking was the customary accompaniment for most leisure activities in America.
Marihuana, unlike alcohol, was generally unknown to the American people until the 1960s. The drug was first discovered during the first decade of the twentieth century among Mexican immigrant communities in the Southwest, where marihuana was used both recreationally and medicinally. Shortly after the initial discovery of this customary practice, local officials succumbed to the influence of xenophobic prejudices and seized on marihuana use as a medium to suppress unwanted Mexican immigrants. To gain support for legislation suppressing marihuana, these local officials verified and spread rumors that the use of marihuana caused crime and violence. In time, marihuana began to appear in the cities. The same biased rumors inspired authorities in the cities to meld marihuana into the evolving Progressive policy toward narcotic drugs. Prohibition was the cornerstone of this policy. Thus, during the first quarter of the twentieth century, state and local laws were easily passed against the non-medicinal use of marihuana. However, after examining these early efforts to prohibit the drug, decriminalization scholars were quick to note the troubling absence of any scientific or historical evidence to suggest the existence of a true problem with marihuana. Instead, they traced the rationale for the isolated incidences of legislation on the state and local levels to xenophobia and the emerging Progressive policy with regard to narcotic drugs.
In 1930, the newly created Federal Bureau of Narcotics adopted marihuana as a federal issue. According to decriminalization scholars, the Bureau proceeded on the basis of the previously given rationale for state and local legislation, freely citing the unfounded rumors of xenophobic officials and the prevaricated data of overzealous Progressives as a precedent for its action. The Bureau believed that this body of information was credible. Of course, this explanation implies that the people in the Bureau were totally ignorant of unbiased and objective data gathering techniques, otherwise known as the scientific method. By the 1930s, the scientific method was the standard applied to all questions needing objective answers, but for some reason this practice was ignored within the Bureau.
Despite the Bureau's puzzling disregard for objectivity, decriminalization scholars maintained that the Bureau's decision to demonize marihuana in the 1930s, and especially from 1935 on, was an unfortunate result of the ideological climate of the day, Progressivism tempered by the latent xenophobia of the middle- and upper-class WASP majority. The previous explanation tends to lose the historical truth by feeding the interpreter into the convenience of its logic, since it leads one to believe that the Bureau was merely acting as an extension of the general will of the people. To the contrary, the simplicity of such an explanation fails to take into account the fact that the Bureau created the prevalent public opinion through the final act of demonization. This act was definitely premeditated and the Bureau was primarily responsible.
Until recently, the decriminalization thesis was the only academic explanation for the prohibition of marihuana. However, during the past decade a second generation of legalization literature has surfaced. This new movement presented a conspiracy thesis to explain why the Federal Bureau of Narcotics demonized marihuana in the 1930s. At first glance the conspiracy thesis seems like quite a stretch of the imagination from the decriminalization movement's attempt to describe a docile Bureau, which acted on the public's outcry against the evils of marihuana. Instead, the conspiracy thesis suggested that hemp was destined to become one of the largest cash crop ever grown because of its industrial value as a source of raw cellulose. According to Jack Herer, the leading proponent of this second generation of legalization literature, the Bureau was a tool of vested interests who sought to protect their business investments because they feared the loss of profits if hemp made a comeback as an industrial commodity.
The company which was cited as having the most to lose was E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Company, hereafter referred to as Du Pont. During the company's one hundred year plus history it had transacted business with only two banks. One of these banks was the Mellon Bank of Pittsburgh. This bank was owned by the Secretary of Treasury, Andrew Mellon. On the basis of this banking connection, Herer assumed that Mellon's interests were in tune with Du Pont's interests in the most intimate manner financially. As the Secretary of Treasury, Mellon appointed his future nephew-in-law, Harry J. Anslinger, to head the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The new Commissioner and his Bureau successfully lobbied for the prohibition of marihuana just as the new hemp industry began to emerge as a potential threat to Du Pont's business.
As further confirmation of Du Pont's intentions, Herer cited a Du Pont Annual Report from 1937. On the pages of this report, investment in the company was recommended by Du Pont's chairman, who somehow foresaw that "radical changes from the revenue raising power of government would be converted into instruments for forcing acceptance of sudden new ideas of industrial and social reorganization." Herer acknowledged the previous statement as a signal from Du Pont's chairman that the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was created to protect company interests. Apparently, Du Pont had patented processes and was developing others to make plastics from oil and coal, as well as paper pulp from wood. In all, these lucrative chemical patents accounted for eighty percent of Du Pont's business during the following fifty-year period. This meant that Du Pont had billions at stake, which were invested in processes to derive cellulose from raw materials other than hemp. If hemp had remained legal, Du Pont would not have had the market cornered on cellulose-based industries. With these thoughts in mind, Herer suggested that Du Pont conspired with Mellon to eliminate the competition.
In addition to Du Pont and Mellon, Herer also noted the significant role played by the nation's largest publisher, the Hearst syndicate, in helping to create the fundamental story line about the new narcotic menace, marihuana. When the Bureau was created in 1930, it adopted views similar to those of Hearst, gave them the authority of the federal government, and paraded them before the public as the truth. According to Herer, Hearst's brand of anti-marihuana journalism was initially influenced by his extreme prejudice toward Mexicans, African-Americans, and the jazz movement. However, later during the 1930s, Hearst recycled his old stories and used them as cover to protect his substantial financial interest in the paper industry.
The second generation conspiracy thesis sheds new insight on the central question of this thesis: Why was marihuana demonized during the 1930s? Specifically, the idea of a conspiracy is intriguing. And new original research reveals virgin information which supports the conclusions of the second generation conspiracy thesis. Evidently, during the 1930s, the idea that vested interests were exerting a controlling influence on the course of public policy was a serious topic both in the media and in the federal government. By the late 1920s, after a decade of Federal Trade Commission investigations into the lobbying activities of gigantic public utility holding companies, the truth about the corrupting influence of these vested interests was finally beginning to reach the public. The methods of persuasions employed by the private concerns were as blatant as courting government officials to as subtle as distributing propaganda to school children and placing editorials in newspapers. Building on such revelations, an enormous money trust was uncovered in 1933. Du Pont and the Mellon Bank were both participants in this money trust, which was ultimately presided over by the nation's most powerful banking house, J. P. Morgan & Company.
At the height of these proceedings J. P. Morgan, Jr. appeared before the Senate Banking and Finance Committee Hearings and rendered the following opinion about the business of high finance.
"I state without hesitation that I consider the private banker a national asset and not a national danger. As to the theory that he may become too powerful, it must be remembered that any power which he has comes, not from the possession of large means, but from the confidence of the people in his character and credit, and that that power, having no force to back it, would disappear at once if people thought that the character had changed or the credit had diminished - not financial credit, but that which comes from the respect and esteem of the community."
Throughout the investigations, special prosecutor Ferdinand Pecora made a mockery of Morgan's previous statement. From the testimony of the nation's leading bankers and the analysis of their company's records, Pecora revealed an intricate web of interlocking directorates among the nation's leading banks and corporations. Based on his observations, Pecora suggested the existence of an economic monopoly of national proportions.
Such an accusation was a common theme among the reactionary elements of the day, who frequently alleged that the American economy was controlled by a "money trust." What these reactionaries observed during the early 1930s was the grand culmination of the Morgan inspired movement to consolidate business interests. Theoretically, the resultant monopolies would create financial stability amidst the chaos of competition. However, in reality, the situation pandered to self-interest. By controlling the boards of the nation's leading corporations and industry committees, certain banks, particularly J. P. Morgan & Company, were able to exert an invisible influence over the course of economic development in America. Monetary gain always preceded all other matters.
The implicit irony between Morgan's lofty statement and the actual truth about the American business environment has a very profound relevance to this particular inquiry; specifically, the idea that the power to influence events does not lie in financial means, but rather in the trust of the public. Irony pervades this naïve belief. In economics money directs the final outcome of events. Time and time again, the historical record clearly demonstrates that business interests have taken precedence over the mandates of moral majorities and the consideration of the public's welfare. The case is no different when applied to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' campaign against marihuana. Certain industries controlled by the money trust stood to lose billions of dollars in revenue if the new hemp industry was successful. The innate desire to protect their business investments motivated the leaders of the threatened industries to seek the aid of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to ensure the failure of the new hemp industry. Acting on these hidden motives, the Bureau implemented an educational propaganda campaign about the evils of marihuana. On the basis of the evidence presented by the Bureau, marihuana was effectively demonized in the minds of the American public and the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was passed by Congress. Together, the act of demonization and regulatory legislation destroyed the chances of the new hemp industry becoming established as a viable economy in America.
On the ensuing pages, an elaborate argument to support the main contention of this thesis, that the new hemp industry was politically assassinated by the money trust, will be presented. First, in order to justify the concept of demonization, which is central to this thesis, the history of the role of marihuana throughout the centuries in the world at large and in America, in particular, will be briefly provided. A thorough explanation of the origins of the new hemp industry will be included with this history. In the next section the material will trace the evolution of the marihuana issue in America. Continuing, the two previous sections will then be tied together and the focus will shift onto the final act of demonization, which resulted in the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. For the final two sections of this thesis, additional evidence in support of the main contention will be presented by analyzing the immediate repercussions of the Tax Act and the aftermath of prohibition. When finished, this thesis should have created a foundation for further detailed investigations of what is a uniquely American dilemma, the prohibition of marihuana because of the hemp plant's economic promise.
Nuff said???
This is propaganda bullshit! I've been smokin' now 16 years. And plenty of my folks been blazin' as long as me (if not longer) and they all remain in full control of their faculties. If you have tendencies such as suicide or a history of mental health issues, a simple argument with ya girlfriend can set you off.
Since Relic was so kind to post that U.S. government propaganda (r u an agent?), I'd like to counter with some, let's just call 'em "actualities". I stress to all you younger cats never take information at face value. RESEARCH. No matter the subject. You can find tons of information on misinformation or you can be spoon fed whatever those in power want you to believe. We're all unwilling pawns in this game. Those with money and power against those who have neither. There was talk regarding alcohol. Research. http://www.saferchoice.org/content/view/24/53/
Check this thesis out!
Abstract of Masters Thesis Presented to the Faculty
of the Division of Humanities of Pepperdine University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts
By
John Craig Lupien
April, 1995
Chair: John McClung, Ph. D.
The primary goal of this thesis is to reveal a new perspective with regard to the dilemma of the prohibition of marihuana. In particular, the subject matter delves into the specific history of the hemp industry of the 1930s. According to this author's research, the circumstances surrounding the evolution of the marihuana issue in the United States were directly effected by certain developments in the hemp and wood pulp industries of the 1930s. Aspects of this thesis are not entirely original and the author is indebted to the efforts of previous researchers. However, the main arguments of this thesis have been based upon original material.
Introduction
Hidden Motives
Since the dawn of civilization, people have cultivated the plant known scientifically as cannabis and agriculturally as hemp for its fiber, seed, and pharmaceutical properties. Throughout the world, the records of archaeology and history reveal that humanity universally recognized the benefits of this unique plant. Such recognition ended abruptly in 1930, when the newly created Federal Bureau of Narcotics began to educate the American public about marihuana, as hemp had been known colloquially in the Sonoran region of Mexico. Between 1930 and 1934, the Bureau compiled a body of misinformation which suggested that the use of marihuana was directly linked to crime, induced violent behavior, and caused insanity. Then, suddenly, in 1935, the Bureau flooded the nation with educational propaganda against marihuana use. During this act of demonization, the Bureau continuously cited its own accumulated body of misinformation as a precedent for legislation on the federal level. Through this studied deception, the Bureau effectively lobbied for the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, which considerably restricted the usage, distribution, and production of marihuana. Significantly, restrictions on marihuana automatically implied restrictions on the cultivation of hemp.
Several highly suspicious circumstances surround the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' demonization of marihuana in the 1930s. First, there never was a marihuana problem; this manufactured malady was a great media spoof. Secondly, the misinformation, which was disseminated to the public by the Bureau, was based on conjecture and hearsay; the objective truth and the scientific method were summarily discarded. Furthermore, the Bureau even suppressed and ignored information which was unbiased, objective, and contradicted its own special brand of demonization. The whole scenario of the Bureau's "marihuana education" program is an amazing example of how easily the American public could be deceived by a slick propaganda campaign. In retrospect, this trail of deceitful acts raises the possibility that the Bureau's decision to demonize marihuana may have been prompted by hidden motives.
By strange coincidence the final assault of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics on marihuana occurred simultaneously with its own awareness of the emergence of a new hemp industry in America in 1935. This new hemp industry was based on the commercial practicability of producing raw cellulose pulp from hemp for the manufacture of paper. The Bureau seems to have demonized marihuana for motives that went far beyond its mandate to legally regulate the production and distribution of the drug. Specifically, the Bureau provided the perfect vehicle for vested interests who wanted to terminate the movement to develop a hemp-based paper industry. Marihuana was demonized by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in the 1930s because of the hemp plant's promising economic future.
This hypothesis, that the demonization of marihuana was a result of the hemp plant's economic potential, is not entirely original. In large part it is based on the observations of previous researchers. Their insights into why the Federal Bureau of Narcotics demonized marihuana in the 1930s are particularly relevant to this hypothesis. Because of this relevancy, it is necessary to briefly introduce the basic arguments of these previous researchers. The arguments may be easily separated into two sets of explanations.
The first explanation was provided by the decriminalization movement, which started in the late 1960s. According to decriminalization scholars, the prohibition of marihuana should be understood as an unfortunate result of the ideological climate of the day. Typically, modern historians use the term Progressive to describe the ideological climate of the early twentieth century. This period of time was characterized by strong convictions favoring the ideals of Calvinistic Protestantism, Scientific Materialism, and Uninhibited Capitalism. Aspects of these three philosophies were blended in America and became manifest in Progressivism, the ideology of the predominantly WASP upper- and middle-classes.
For the everyday person caught in the grind of everyday life Progressivism translated into an endless quantification of one's value toward society. Value was measured by the job or work being performed by the person. Jobs or work were graded on the basis of the wealth they generated. This situation created a hierarchy in which the wealthy elite formed an plutocracy. In order to justify its existence this plutocracy actively promoted Progressivism. The essential tenet of this philosophy was based on the strategy of promoting the virtues of work and chastising the vices of idleness. To entice the masses to follow this ethic, the ideology was imbued with the assumption that hard work was the secret to material wealth and earthly paradise. From this syllogism, it was only natural that the acquisition of material wealth was portrayed as the ideal pursuit for people. This formula for success was the source of the modern American work ethic.
The Progressive mentality infected the predominantly WASP upper- and middle-classes of America. This socio-economic and cultural cross-section of American society was deeply affected by a latent xenophobia. This innate nativism definitely prejudiced the Progressive policy toward drugs during the first quarter of the twentieth century. Ideologically, the Progressives followed the notion that certain social customs were vices which impeded people from focusing on their work and generating more wealth. On the basis of this reasoning, the federal government was pressured to impose moral imperatives on the American populace by removing perceived vices through prohibitive legislation. The most well-known historical example of this type of Progressive social experimentation was the Eighteenth Amendment, the prohibition of alcohol. Ironically, Western cultures had always considered alcohol to be an acceptable vice. The failure of prohibition during the 1920s is attributed to the previous consideration, since drinking was the customary accompaniment for most leisure activities in America.
Marihuana, unlike alcohol, was generally unknown to the American people until the 1960s. The drug was first discovered during the first decade of the twentieth century among Mexican immigrant communities in the Southwest, where marihuana was used both recreationally and medicinally. Shortly after the initial discovery of this customary practice, local officials succumbed to the influence of xenophobic prejudices and seized on marihuana use as a medium to suppress unwanted Mexican immigrants. To gain support for legislation suppressing marihuana, these local officials verified and spread rumors that the use of marihuana caused crime and violence. In time, marihuana began to appear in the cities. The same biased rumors inspired authorities in the cities to meld marihuana into the evolving Progressive policy toward narcotic drugs. Prohibition was the cornerstone of this policy. Thus, during the first quarter of the twentieth century, state and local laws were easily passed against the non-medicinal use of marihuana. However, after examining these early efforts to prohibit the drug, decriminalization scholars were quick to note the troubling absence of any scientific or historical evidence to suggest the existence of a true problem with marihuana. Instead, they traced the rationale for the isolated incidences of legislation on the state and local levels to xenophobia and the emerging Progressive policy with regard to narcotic drugs.
In 1930, the newly created Federal Bureau of Narcotics adopted marihuana as a federal issue. According to decriminalization scholars, the Bureau proceeded on the basis of the previously given rationale for state and local legislation, freely citing the unfounded rumors of xenophobic officials and the prevaricated data of overzealous Progressives as a precedent for its action. The Bureau believed that this body of information was credible. Of course, this explanation implies that the people in the Bureau were totally ignorant of unbiased and objective data gathering techniques, otherwise known as the scientific method. By the 1930s, the scientific method was the standard applied to all questions needing objective answers, but for some reason this practice was ignored within the Bureau.
Despite the Bureau's puzzling disregard for objectivity, decriminalization scholars maintained that the Bureau's decision to demonize marihuana in the 1930s, and especially from 1935 on, was an unfortunate result of the ideological climate of the day, Progressivism tempered by the latent xenophobia of the middle- and upper-class WASP majority. The previous explanation tends to lose the historical truth by feeding the interpreter into the convenience of its logic, since it leads one to believe that the Bureau was merely acting as an extension of the general will of the people. To the contrary, the simplicity of such an explanation fails to take into account the fact that the Bureau created the prevalent public opinion through the final act of demonization. This act was definitely premeditated and the Bureau was primarily responsible.
Until recently, the decriminalization thesis was the only academic explanation for the prohibition of marihuana. However, during the past decade a second generation of legalization literature has surfaced. This new movement presented a conspiracy thesis to explain why the Federal Bureau of Narcotics demonized marihuana in the 1930s. At first glance the conspiracy thesis seems like quite a stretch of the imagination from the decriminalization movement's attempt to describe a docile Bureau, which acted on the public's outcry against the evils of marihuana. Instead, the conspiracy thesis suggested that hemp was destined to become one of the largest cash crop ever grown because of its industrial value as a source of raw cellulose. According to Jack Herer, the leading proponent of this second generation of legalization literature, the Bureau was a tool of vested interests who sought to protect their business investments because they feared the loss of profits if hemp made a comeback as an industrial commodity.
The company which was cited as having the most to lose was E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Company, hereafter referred to as Du Pont. During the company's one hundred year plus history it had transacted business with only two banks. One of these banks was the Mellon Bank of Pittsburgh. This bank was owned by the Secretary of Treasury, Andrew Mellon. On the basis of this banking connection, Herer assumed that Mellon's interests were in tune with Du Pont's interests in the most intimate manner financially. As the Secretary of Treasury, Mellon appointed his future nephew-in-law, Harry J. Anslinger, to head the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The new Commissioner and his Bureau successfully lobbied for the prohibition of marihuana just as the new hemp industry began to emerge as a potential threat to Du Pont's business.
As further confirmation of Du Pont's intentions, Herer cited a Du Pont Annual Report from 1937. On the pages of this report, investment in the company was recommended by Du Pont's chairman, who somehow foresaw that "radical changes from the revenue raising power of government would be converted into instruments for forcing acceptance of sudden new ideas of industrial and social reorganization." Herer acknowledged the previous statement as a signal from Du Pont's chairman that the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was created to protect company interests. Apparently, Du Pont had patented processes and was developing others to make plastics from oil and coal, as well as paper pulp from wood. In all, these lucrative chemical patents accounted for eighty percent of Du Pont's business during the following fifty-year period. This meant that Du Pont had billions at stake, which were invested in processes to derive cellulose from raw materials other than hemp. If hemp had remained legal, Du Pont would not have had the market cornered on cellulose-based industries. With these thoughts in mind, Herer suggested that Du Pont conspired with Mellon to eliminate the competition.
In addition to Du Pont and Mellon, Herer also noted the significant role played by the nation's largest publisher, the Hearst syndicate, in helping to create the fundamental story line about the new narcotic menace, marihuana. When the Bureau was created in 1930, it adopted views similar to those of Hearst, gave them the authority of the federal government, and paraded them before the public as the truth. According to Herer, Hearst's brand of anti-marihuana journalism was initially influenced by his extreme prejudice toward Mexicans, African-Americans, and the jazz movement. However, later during the 1930s, Hearst recycled his old stories and used them as cover to protect his substantial financial interest in the paper industry.
The second generation conspiracy thesis sheds new insight on the central question of this thesis: Why was marihuana demonized during the 1930s? Specifically, the idea of a conspiracy is intriguing. And new original research reveals virgin information which supports the conclusions of the second generation conspiracy thesis. Evidently, during the 1930s, the idea that vested interests were exerting a controlling influence on the course of public policy was a serious topic both in the media and in the federal government. By the late 1920s, after a decade of Federal Trade Commission investigations into the lobbying activities of gigantic public utility holding companies, the truth about the corrupting influence of these vested interests was finally beginning to reach the public. The methods of persuasions employed by the private concerns were as blatant as courting government officials to as subtle as distributing propaganda to school children and placing editorials in newspapers. Building on such revelations, an enormous money trust was uncovered in 1933. Du Pont and the Mellon Bank were both participants in this money trust, which was ultimately presided over by the nation's most powerful banking house, J. P. Morgan & Company.
At the height of these proceedings J. P. Morgan, Jr. appeared before the Senate Banking and Finance Committee Hearings and rendered the following opinion about the business of high finance.
"I state without hesitation that I consider the private banker a national asset and not a national danger. As to the theory that he may become too powerful, it must be remembered that any power which he has comes, not from the possession of large means, but from the confidence of the people in his character and credit, and that that power, having no force to back it, would disappear at once if people thought that the character had changed or the credit had diminished - not financial credit, but that which comes from the respect and esteem of the community."
Throughout the investigations, special prosecutor Ferdinand Pecora made a mockery of Morgan's previous statement. From the testimony of the nation's leading bankers and the analysis of their company's records, Pecora revealed an intricate web of interlocking directorates among the nation's leading banks and corporations. Based on his observations, Pecora suggested the existence of an economic monopoly of national proportions.
Such an accusation was a common theme among the reactionary elements of the day, who frequently alleged that the American economy was controlled by a "money trust." What these reactionaries observed during the early 1930s was the grand culmination of the Morgan inspired movement to consolidate business interests. Theoretically, the resultant monopolies would create financial stability amidst the chaos of competition. However, in reality, the situation pandered to self-interest. By controlling the boards of the nation's leading corporations and industry committees, certain banks, particularly J. P. Morgan & Company, were able to exert an invisible influence over the course of economic development in America. Monetary gain always preceded all other matters.
The implicit irony between Morgan's lofty statement and the actual truth about the American business environment has a very profound relevance to this particular inquiry; specifically, the idea that the power to influence events does not lie in financial means, but rather in the trust of the public. Irony pervades this naïve belief. In economics money directs the final outcome of events. Time and time again, the historical record clearly demonstrates that business interests have taken precedence over the mandates of moral majorities and the consideration of the public's welfare. The case is no different when applied to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' campaign against marihuana. Certain industries controlled by the money trust stood to lose billions of dollars in revenue if the new hemp industry was successful. The innate desire to protect their business investments motivated the leaders of the threatened industries to seek the aid of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics to ensure the failure of the new hemp industry. Acting on these hidden motives, the Bureau implemented an educational propaganda campaign about the evils of marihuana. On the basis of the evidence presented by the Bureau, marihuana was effectively demonized in the minds of the American public and the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was passed by Congress. Together, the act of demonization and regulatory legislation destroyed the chances of the new hemp industry becoming established as a viable economy in America.
On the ensuing pages, an elaborate argument to support the main contention of this thesis, that the new hemp industry was politically assassinated by the money trust, will be presented. First, in order to justify the concept of demonization, which is central to this thesis, the history of the role of marihuana throughout the centuries in the world at large and in America, in particular, will be briefly provided. A thorough explanation of the origins of the new hemp industry will be included with this history. In the next section the material will trace the evolution of the marihuana issue in America. Continuing, the two previous sections will then be tied together and the focus will shift onto the final act of demonization, which resulted in the passage of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937. For the final two sections of this thesis, additional evidence in support of the main contention will be presented by analyzing the immediate repercussions of the Tax Act and the aftermath of prohibition. When finished, this thesis should have created a foundation for further detailed investigations of what is a uniquely American dilemma, the prohibition of marihuana because of the hemp plant's economic promise.
Nuff said???
S
Svenghali
Guest
That's absolutely correct. You've deciphered it in one shot. Ur not an agent! Agents have been brainwashed to believe it that it has nothing to do with the letters. Well done my man.
Hopefully you're not gettin' sensitive when I say, do you research (I said that in encouraging way, not in a 'disrespectful manner). I know you're a bright dude from your posts, so I wouldn't expect that, but you never know 'round here. But it's still propaganda.
For more depth see:
http://crrh.org/cannabis/
http://crrh.org/cannabis/dea.html
http://www.hempcar.org/diesel.shtml
http://www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/History/whiteb1.htm
http://rxmarijuana.com/excerpts.htm
Chrono
polyphonically beyond me
ill o.g.
Battle Points: 5
very interesting information Svenghali. I had to originally quit because of contacts and then when I did get a contact a great job opened itself to me so i decided not to risk it. I'm now just getting to the point where I really don't care.. it would be nice but at the same time if I start smoking again then I will be in a position where i won't want to give it up again. I do miss it though.. although 17 years of smoke was nice and now i'm running in getting in great shape.. can't smoke forever and expect it to never catch up with you (lung-wise)
respect
respect
S
Svenghali
Guest
Point taken. You have to do what works best for you Chrono. I may decide at 50 to stop smoking or I may not til I return to stardust. I'm not sayin' there aren't harmful effects that could be had from smokin' marijuana, but let's be practical, in comparison to the effects of alcohol, tobacco and legal prescription drugs, you have to admit marijuana is mild. If you don't buy that, research it and do a comparison. The demonization, propaganda and hypocrisy of these types of reports display man's willingness and ability to influence the masses with propoganda (for their own purposes) despite the obvious. There should be a national outcry to ban alcohol if that's the case. Alcohol is "socially" accepted thus, ok to get shit faced to where you can't remember how you got home and how the fat chick ended up in your bed pregnant. How many drunks beat the shit out of each other in bars and outside of clubs. Ever hear of two dudes high on Mary J fighting? Never. Let's not mention the number of mothers, fathers, brothers, uncles and friends whose lives were lost to drunk drivers? How many marijuana related fatalities were there on the road last year? Ingesting too much alcohol can actually kill you. Ever heard of anyone overdosin' on weed? Never. I'm not encouraging you to start smoking again. But just cause it's reported in the "news" doesn't necessarily make it so.
Check out this site: Marijuana Myths, Marijuana Facts: A Review of the Scientific Evidence . A decade after the book was published, the latest scientific evidence continues to support the original findings. http://www.drugpolicy.org/marijuana/factsmyths/.
I'm about to go roll me some Grand Daddy Purple right now!!!
Ez
Chrono
polyphonically beyond me
ill o.g.
Battle Points: 5
well i would have never originally quit but I lost my only contact.. that's when i started drinking more (because it was my only option). Turned out I didn't know how to drink without smoking and ended gettin' too shitty, although i never drank outside the house for legal reasons (not wanting to risk arrest). Anyway.. alcohol has always fucked with me and is never good.. i haven't drank in over a week now and have started to fill the void with my production (which was sacrificed to the fermentation god for years). I definitely feel that if anything should be illegal is should be alcohol or tobacco. Alcohol is a terrible intox that is ultimately not satisfied till the user is blacked out and tobacco gives no high and rips years from one's future. Cannabis is harmful but is relaxing and delivers a great payoff for the harm being caused. Unlike alcohol I only want to smoke so much and then make beats for cheese to a movie.. it's the perfect intox for me..
In my current situation though, I got myself into school years ago and will begin a job in my field soon so I have a test to pass and also about 4 more years of school to go (at-least). In the next 5-10 years once I get everything perfectly situated so that no tests are a possibility and it won't hinder me (schoolwork or job performance) then I will most likely smoke a little. When you get into a new field you are learning new terminology, skills and many other things so I need everything on deck for full potential type possibilities. Also, if I have a family one day and she is 95% cool for a great marriage but she doesn't smoke (and I haven't smoked in 5-10 years then I seriously doubt I would begin).
This propaganda brainwashing society who believe heroin, crack and cannabis are all DOPE and alcohol is for Adults make society, thus girls i would date, ignorant to the facts.
I live in a particularly brainwashed and sheepy part of America.. but I would think it would be better for someone like me in Canada or Europe somewhere.
peace
In my current situation though, I got myself into school years ago and will begin a job in my field soon so I have a test to pass and also about 4 more years of school to go (at-least). In the next 5-10 years once I get everything perfectly situated so that no tests are a possibility and it won't hinder me (schoolwork or job performance) then I will most likely smoke a little. When you get into a new field you are learning new terminology, skills and many other things so I need everything on deck for full potential type possibilities. Also, if I have a family one day and she is 95% cool for a great marriage but she doesn't smoke (and I haven't smoked in 5-10 years then I seriously doubt I would begin).
This propaganda brainwashing society who believe heroin, crack and cannabis are all DOPE and alcohol is for Adults make society, thus girls i would date, ignorant to the facts.
I live in a particularly brainwashed and sheepy part of America.. but I would think it would be better for someone like me in Canada or Europe somewhere.
peace
The original post was from something I came across on the net, I figured it would get lots of attention here, which it has..
Me? Im light weight as hell. A dime will last a month, a quake? Shit like 3 months.
Which is good because its cheaper for me that way!
Im totally prolegalisation
Me? Im light weight as hell. A dime will last a month, a quake? Shit like 3 months.
Which is good because its cheaper for me that way!
Im totally prolegalisation
Chrono
polyphonically beyond me
ill o.g.
Battle Points: 5
i made an 8th last a week or two if I was careful but definitely lightweight compared to my old crew.. blazin a 3gm blunt was nothing to my man... always thought that was dumb as hell though.. keep your tolerance low and you will save for cash and live longer.. course in those teenage days i think he thought he was cool to waste that cash like that.. who knows.. i never smoked much cause it made me freak out.. ahahah i'll admit that
Smoke weed...
It's good for you...
Can't be worse than drinking liquor every day..
I'd rather be a pothead than an alcoholic
At this point in my life, I'm neither (thank god). But if I had a choice on my addiction...it'll be weed...
It's good for you...
Can't be worse than drinking liquor every day..
I'd rather be a pothead than an alcoholic
At this point in my life, I'm neither (thank god). But if I had a choice on my addiction...it'll be weed...